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บทคัดย่อ
บทความนี้มีวัตถุประสงค์เพื่อวิเคราะห์คำบรรยายของฮุสเซิร์ลใน
หนังสือที่ชื่อว่า “ปรากฏการณ์วิทยาแห่งสำนึกเรื่องกาลเวลา” ซึ่งได้รับการตี
พิมพ์ในปี ค.ศ. 1928 งานชิ้นนี้อธิบายแนวคิดของเขาในเรื่องการทำพื้นที่ให้มี
ความหมายของกาลเวลาได้กระจ่างชัด ฮุสเซิร์ลยืนยันว่า โดยกระบวนการดังกล่าว
ประสบการณ์อันมีชีวิตชีวาจะถูกรับรู้ได้เสมือนหนึ่งเป็นภาพตัวแทนของ
ความจริงท่ีทุกคนเข้าใจได้ตรงกัน หน่ึงร้อยปีท่ีผ่านมา นักปรากฏการณ์วิทยาได้นำ
แนวคิดเร่ืองกาลเวลาของฮุสเซิร์ลไปประยุกต์ใช้กับการประเมินคุณค่างานศิลปะโดย
ตัดสินกันท่ีความสามารถในการถ่ายทอดสัจธรรม ในด้านสถาปัตยกรรม ทฤษฎี
การรับรู้แบบปรากฏการณ์วิทยาเป็นท่ีรู้จักกันดีในฐานะท่ีให้แนวทางออกแบบอาคารให้มี
ความหมายของการต้ังหลักปักถ่ินฐาน ถึงกระน้ันผลงานของฮุสเซิร์ลช้ินน้ีก็ยังถูก
ท้าทายอยู่เสมอ โดยเฉพาะอย่างย่ิงสมมติฐานเร่ืองความถูกต้องแม่นยำของกาล
เวลาท่ีแต่ละคนรับรู้ได้ตรงกันโดยไม่ต้องอาศัยอุปกรณ์ใดๆ  ความจริงเชิงภววิสัย
จะได้รับการสร้างขึ้นภายในจิตสำนึกผ่านตัวงานสถาปัตยกรรมได้อย่างไร
บทความน้ีพยายามท่ีจะตอบคำถามดังกล่าว
Abstract
Husserl, in his work The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Con-
sciousness, developed ideas concerning a process of object formation
called temporalizing space.  He affirmed that by such a process, lived
experience can be perceived as a sign of objective reality.  Throughout the
late century, phenomenologists have applied Husserl’s notion of internal
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time to justify the work of art in relation to truth. This can be extended to
the architectural field, where the phenomenological theory of perception
has been related to the idea of building and dwelling.  Even as Husserl’s
work has been frequently challenged, his approach to time consciousness
is still valuable in approaching the question of how objective reality be
constituted through a piece of architecture.
I.  The Temporality of Architecture
The past was left behind by thee, the future state has
not yet come.
But who with vision clear can see.  The present which
is here and now…
The Buddha’s sayings1
It is often the case with ancient buildings that they risk irrelevance
in the current age. Some are considered to be representative of a particu-
lar time and its particular standards for judging what is beautiful about a
building.  Yet they are often ignored by the local people, as is the case with
the ruins of old cities in the centre of new ones.  For many Westerners,
“ruins have a richly layered aesthetic”2, yet this is not the case for every
community in the world. They are confronted by the more practical prob-
lem of how a current population can coexist with historical ruins.  Some
propose the expulsion of the local population out of the sites of ancient
ruins so that material forms of shape, color, solid and void are conve-
niently preserved.  Others believe that while architectural beauty is re-
sidual, living beings should take priority. It is believed that people are key
in maintaining the temporality of these ancient buildings. This leads to an
important question in the philosophy of architecture concerning both an-
cient and modern buildings: what is the real meaning latent in a faade?
In phenomenological aesthetics, founded by Edmund Husserl
(1859-1938), a thing is considered beautiful depending on the subject’s
sense of lived experience.3  In the case of a spatial object, Husserl as-
serted that its position in space seen by our visual field is not sufficient, for
instance “the appearance of a house is not beside or over the house, one
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meter from it, etc”.4   In addition, it needs a place in time for a lived expe-
rience to happen and so its significance can be perceived by everyone.
This temporality of a spatial object is considered as an entity to enable us
to see more clearly what objective reality is.  For example, a house, not a
faade, can show itself in its place without distorting its real meaning from
anything else.  As a result of becoming a temporal object, even a plane
surface of space can be considered beautiful.  However, this time cannot
be measured by chronometers or clocks, since it refers to an internal time
determined by peoples’ themselves.  This time-consciousness thus is es-
sential to the appearance of something beautiful and can be extended to
understanding the beauty of a piece of architecture or a landscape. Husserl
remarked:
…a temporal object may be beautiful, pleasant, use-
ful, etc., and may be all this in a determinate time.  But the
beauty, pleasantness, and so on, has no place in nature
and in time.  These qualities are not what appears in pre-
sentation and presentification.5
This article aims at analyzing Husserl’s lectures on time6, The Phe-
nomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness (1928) in order to clarify
his thought about the temporalizing of space to affirm the possibility of
emerging meaningful place as a sign of objective reality.  Throughout the
In a historically significant area of Bangkok, behind the Mahakan Fort is an old
community that will be demolished.  http://www.muangboranjournal. com/
modules.php?name=Sections&op=viewarticle&artid=51
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last century, phenomenologists, such as Martin Heidegger (1889-1976)
and Maurice Merleau Ponty (1908-61), have applied Husserl’s notion of
internal time to understand the work of art in relation to “truth”.  Thereaf-
ter a major enquiry of the phenomenologist is “how is truth disclosed
aesthetically?”7 In the architectural field, the phenomenological theory of
perception has been known through a work of Christian Noberg-Schulz
(1926-2000) as a fundamental idea of dwelling building.8 In addition to
the artistic sphere, Husserl’s lectures on time are admired as a major influ-
ence on continental philosophy.9  Even so, this work has been frequently
challenged, in particular his presumption of the accuracy of subjective
time and his providing complicated methodology to guard against error.10
Anyway, there is no independent objective reality, it is subjectively con-
structed through temporality.  So it can ultimately be said that phenom-
enological aesthetics deals with illusion.  So the question then arises: how
objective reality can be constituted through a piece of architecture?  This
paper tries to respond to this question.
The first part of this article, will introduce the problem of the tem-
porality of architecture. It will then address time, space and lived experi-
ence in Husserlian phenomenology and proceed to examine his ideas con-
cerning the temporalizing of space as making possible the emergence of a
beautiful thing.  It will then discuss the relationship between architecture
and objective reality. Finally, it will evaluate Husserl’s theory about
temporalizing space.
The old marketplace of
Samchuk, Suphan Buri
province, picked up a
Unesco Asia-Pacific
Award of Merit 2009.
http://saisampan.net/in-
dex. php?topic=27774.0.
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II.  Time, Space and Lived Experience in Husserlian Phenomenology
Professionally, Husserl was trained in mathematics.  Basically, math-
ematics is a process of deduction that tries to analyze the facts of nature
and conjure up latent truth.  The truth is independent from changes in
human thought or feeling.  It is evident that Husserl provides such an ob-
jective viewpoint into the sphere of philosophy so as to explicate the logi-
cal structure of perception from the so-called lived experience.  It was
earlier known in terms of a content of an object a being one and the same
thing.  The object shows itself as a presentation, that is, as the object we
perceive. Even if we close our eyes or we are moving away, we are still
aware of the fact that what we have perceived is identically the same
thing. This is elaborated in his work, Logical Investigations (1900-01):
Whether I look at this book from above or below,
from inside or outside, I always see this book.  It is al-
ways one and the same thing, and that not merely in some
purely physical sense, but according to the sense of the
perception.11
What led Husserl to establish his own theory of perception was
his reaction towards the empiricists’ theory of perception, which was a
major school of thought in the late nineteenth century.  He was critical of
empirical psychology based on three issues.  First, was the tendency of
empirical sciences to define an object in terms of its existence in definite
space and time.  Such psychological theories of perception assert that an
external object is fully independent from the subject.  Second, is the belief
that this independent subject perceives the sensory content of an object,
that is, perception is a result of the penetration of the objects raw materi-
als into the subject’s sense data.  Lastly, is the empirical assertion that in
regard to objective reality, subjectivity is not a concern.  Unfashionably,
Husserl attempted to remedy these problems with the idea of lived expe-
rience.  But, he could not entirely capitulate to the standpoint of Franz
Brentano (1838-1917) who described lived experience as if it is some-
thing enduring, remaining present in a definite space and time in conscious-
ness.  Yet, Husserl was also opposed to the idealists who hold that reality
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was fundamentally mental in nature.  This was due to his limiting lived
experience to the realm of perception.  In particular, perceptual experi-
ence subsists in different phases of time.
Husserl emphasized that his task is to make lived experience com-
pletely intelligible.12  So he dedicated himself to studying lived experience
of space and time for more than a decade, giving lectures on time from
1904-10 and lectures on space in 1907, although he claimed that he fo-
cused on space before his researches on time.  He considered both inte-
gral to the movement of lived experience, yet he emphasized the special
quality of lived experience of time.  Hence his lectures on space seem
incomplete, while he seems to more fully accomplish his task of explicat-
ing lived experience in his lectures on time.  In order to understand the
evolution of Husserl’s thought about time, space and lived experience, I
shall divide his achievement into two parts.  First, I will summarize his
lectures on space and next his lectures on time.
Thing and Space: Lectures of 1907, although not considered as
one of Husserl’s most distinguished works, nevertheless reflects the de-
velopment of his thoughts on inter-correlation between time and space.
In this work, he attempted to examine lived experience as it is spatially
sensed.  He explained how lived experience is constituted through visual
and tactile organs. In particular, the perception of a spatial thing was given
not only in the form of threefold physical space, but it was also given
through the dimension of movement, the so-called kinaesthetic sensa-
tion. This sense was understood as the consciousness of actual and po-
tential action, of the “‘I move myself’ and ‘I can move’”.13  He affirmed
that although this kinaesthesia depended on sensory organs, it had a dif-
ferent sensation because it was psychic lived experience constituted by
the subject.  This moment of lived experience was considered as an es-
sential condition for performing any meaningful special activity in the world
of things, as he argued: “…by the constitution of the one time in which the
temporality of the thing resides”.14  It seems to me that Husserl’s attempt
to search for an authentic experience by investigating a spatial thing was
not a complete failure, because he, at least, discloses its trace.
Husserl’s lectures on time were published in 1928 as The Phe-
nomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, and became a well-known
work.  Here, he attempted to carry out his phenomenological task by
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analyzing the lived experience of time which was identified as pure sub-
jectivity.  Initially, time was defined by way of negation: “not the time of the
world of experience but the immanent time of the flow of consciousness”.15
Despite having character of movement, this subjective time was not a
single line consisting of an orderly series static points of past, present and
future.  It could repeatedly change its position in its mode of appearance
under different subjective conditions.  Husserl looked carefully into time-
consciousness so as to discover what conditions causes its movement to
occur.  In so doing, he provided mathematical methods such as the law of
transitivity16 and the law of modification17 on the assumption that each
mathematical property is a sign of an object appearing in the flow of time.
In other words, it is a temporal object.
Indeed, Husserl explains that subjective time consists of before
and after where each is perceived as a temporal object.  This lived expe-
rience of time involved memory and expectation appearing as the actually
now.  Also, although time-consciousness was subjective, it could be per-
ceived as objective: “temporal Objectivity __ therefore, individual Objec-
tivity in general”.18  This is Husserl’s assumption that the lived experience
of time is the origin of objective reality.  For instance, insofar as we are
conscious of a tonal process as it were, by no means of sense, we are
conscious of what a tone exhibits as a just then or not yet come.  Con-
sequently, we can perceive a tone appearing as one and the same thing at
the same time, not for someone, but for everyone.
To sum up, Husserl’s theory of perception aims to explain the
The flowing of time
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inseparable binding together of subjectivity and objectivity.  It is a fact that
the former is investigated with great care since it is a foundation of the
latter.  As a mathematician, he provides an objective point of view to
verify the systematic property of subjectivity exemplified by analyzing lived
experience.  Husserl’s business in elucidating lived experience of time and
space has been succeeded in his lectures on time.  He discloses that even
if time and space were constituted under the subjective conditions, they
were intelligible without providing physical measurement. Husserl implies
lived experience in the sense of recognition as we live through it.19  This is
the presence of the living present throughout the ceaseless flow of time.
Lived experience of time is defined as perceiving the same thing appearing
as such at the same time.  By this definition, Husserl can overcome empiri-
cal standpoint of view about space and time.  Time-consciousness is a
source of objective reality in which everyone can apprehend without any
physical tool.  As a sign of this pure lived experience, a temporal object is
what appears in memory and expectation; although it changes its position
in the mode of appearance, it shows itself as now continuously. Thus, the
temporality of a thing is a result of constituting lived experience of time; it
is possible through a process which is so-called the temporalizing of space.
III.  Temporalizing Space in Husserl’s Lectures on Time
The task of a phenomenological aesthetic is to provide an analysis
of the constitution of time and space by going back to what is “truly abso-
lute subjectivity”.20 If a space that makes us aware that our awareness is
itself continuous21, that space is temporalized. Temporalizing space here is
a process of perceiving space becoming a temporal object.  To clarify this
issue, three questions are discussed here. One is “what is temporalizing
space?” “how is it performed?” and “what is its outcome?”
Temporalizing Space Leading to a Beautiful Thing
In Husserl’s lectures on time, the “temporal object” is a key term
for understanding time-consciousness.  Defined differently than an ordi-
nary object, a temporal object appears itself as present and is in the form
of continuity. It refers to the occurrence of any spatial thing having two
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related qualities of time: duration and temporal flow.  In this way, revealing
itself in the passage of time, a piece of architecture can be recognized as
the representative of a true knowledge appearing itself as such at the same
time.
It is notable that a thing which we consider beautiful, which occu-
pies space, can be considered temporal, while beauty cannot. This means
that as a value, beauty has no position in time.  It hence lacks the capacity
of transition. Since Husserl’s aesthetic judgment is based on the criteria of
being a temporal object.  That is to say, if a spatial thing appears itself as
now and yet transcends itself in the continuous flow of time, then it is
beautiful.  Such a self-transcendence is a result of its having something to
say to others.  A beautiful thing can, therefore, communicate messages
living in its background to perceivers, as Husserl said: “Everything in per-
ception has its background…the foreground is nothing without the back-
ground; the appearing side is nothing without the non-appearing”.22  A
spatial thing is beautiful when it can tell the truth.
As a viewer, if we are conscious of messages in a work of art, we
are conscious of time. Time is necessary to the experience of works of art
of all kinds.23 Indeed, both philosophers and artists have common ques-
tions concerning how life should be lived.24  While philosophers recognize
that the understanding of time is essential for arriving at such answers,
nevertheless they encounter difficulties in understanding the flowing of time
itself, as recognized by Saint Augustine (345-430) in Book XI of his Con-
fessions.25
As shown, the purpose of phenomenological aesthetics is to ana-
lyze tacit knowledge which cannot be seen at the first sight.  What follows
is art which serves as a primary means for conveying cognition rather than
expressiveness.  Husserlian phenomenology might agree with aesthetic
cognitivism28 that knowledge makes a spatial thing art.  Nonetheless, an
artwork’s success is not judged by an efficacy of providing knowledge in
practice.  Furthermore, the admiration of technical skill, or even the mood
resulting from contemplation, is just the artwork’s incidental benefits.  Since,
a work of art should be evaluated by providing a true knowledge in the
terms of understanding, interpretation and imagination about “the real-
life” to the viewers.  As far as such true knowledge settles down, empirical
sciences go forward firmly.  This is Husserl’s epistemological standpoint
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that subjectivity is a foundation of objectivity. Temporalizing space, there-
fore, is provided to be a phenomenological approach to evaluate a beau-
tiful thing through its being a representative of objective reality.
Directed Glance of Attention Toward the Appearing Thing
Temporalizing space is initially possible through a directed atten-
tion toward a spatial thing. In other words, it is so-called intentionality29
presenting itself in the form of this intentional act. Husserl described the
outcome of temporalizing space according to two aspects: the external
and internal object. An external object is the external appearance initially
constituted.  For example, in the visual field, if we draw a lot of attention
toward the appearance of a movable thing, then we are conscious of it
actually now.  This directed glance does not just see something, but it is
the perception that makes sense for us, as Husserl said:
If we perceive a flight of birds, a squadron of cavalry
at a gallop, and the like, we find the described distinction
in the underlying basis of sensation…Precisely by this
means, the Objective itself appears,… The appearing
event always has the identical, absolute temporal value
…in the living source point of now there also wells up
ever fresh primal being…Accordingly, the appearance of
sinking back, of withdrawing, arises.30
In the case of an internal object, it is temporal in memory.  It has
its own living extension existing in the retentional phase of consciousness.
The directed glance can carry this remaining present which is an immanent
character of the elapsed temporal object with it forever, thereby tran-
scending from past to now-point of time.  That is, it is the appearance of
two aspects of one and the same thing: immanence and transcendence,
flowing in the stream of time-consciousness.
In addition to moving along attention, some internal objects have
a chance to be fresh again.  Husserl described that in retention, there are
two forms of memory: the one is the memory which can be easily recol-
lected and reproduced and the other is the memory which disappears
from remembrance like it is nearly expired.  The former is in subsisting
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lived experience, while the latter is neutral in spite of having temporality.
Nonetheless, the latter can be refreshed by intentionality to temporalizing
that object again.
For example, when some memories seem to vanish without their
living extension, Husserl described that it is a result of our moving out of
the point of temporal duration, although in fact its temporality is unmoved.
And whenever we are conscious of that memory, this means that inten-
tionality works to give the clarity to lived experience of our memory, as
given now and movement to that expired temporal object, as Husserl
said: “To my consciousness points of temporal duration recede, as points
of stationary object in space recede when I “go away from the object”.
The object retains its place…Its temporal point is unmoved….”31  This
recollection reflects to an importance of the subject as an entirely inten-
tional actor.
Besides, if we regard the directed glance of attention toward the
appearing thing, we can make vanished memory clearer.  Husserl advised
to search for the clue of memory which was obscured like being covered
with a veil.  As a result of paying attention, the actual lived experience will
continually emerge, as Husserl said: “the ‘clear’ (in the first sense) ap-
pears as seen through a veil-unclear now and then, that is more or less
unclear, and so forth.  They belong to the actual lived experience of the
presentification”.32
Temporality in a Beautiful Thing
Undoubtedly, time-consciousness aims at providing a standard
for evaluation of the appearing thing, as Husserl said “an authentic
experience…provides the standard for evaluation of all forms of experi-
ence”.33  Generally, a standard identifies an invariant thing; whether we are
aware of it or not, it constantly exists. Also, our frame of reference has no
capacity of distorting reality to follow our needs.  It’s not only real for us,
but for everyone.  This objective reality, hence, extends to the logical
capacity of an individual to judge what is true or false.  This temporality
should therefore also extend to the work of architecture.
However, in Husserl’s point of view, this objective reality could
not be seen directly in the work of art.  If objective reality is perceived
indirectly through temporalizing space, the beautiful thing is a sign of ob-
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jective reality as smoke is a sign of fire. The trace of objective reality
exists in the temporal ordering consisting of present, past and future.  As in
Husserl’s lectures on time, there is an attempt to seek these clues in spite
of the fact that they move ceaselessly (since time manifests itself in every
place, as well as saturating human experiences, activities and cognitions).
So the temporal object which culminates in an identical unity signifies an
objective reality.  Definitely, a beautiful thing can be a tool of searching for
the truth on condition that time is absolutely perceived.
Let us consider trace of time in a beautiful thing.  There are three
concomitant appearances: the presence of the living present, the presence
of temporal flow and the presence of identical unity.
The Presence of the Living Present
Temporalizing space produces the presence of the living present
as a foreground of its appearance.  In so doing, our visual field is dis-
placed with regard to spatiality united to temporality.
A directed glance of attention toward…this piece of
paper, and, in particular, toward a corner of the paper
which is especially prominent.  This distinction on the ‘sub-
jective side’. The attending itself in its various step, is some-
thing entirely other than what is specifically noted and not
noted in the Object…with regard to the object, now this,
now that is objective in a particular way, and that what is
now specially favored was already there.34
It is notable that such awareness is the lived experience of the
here and now.  This is a result of our perceptual apprehension in discrimi-
nating differences in temporal ordering.  What is now is precisely per-
ceived.  In other words, such directed attention brings about the aware-
ness of an item as occurring in a certain order, although it is running off the
now point of time, as remarked by Husserl: “‘Past’ and ‘now’ exclude
each other.  Something past and something now can indeed be identically
the same but only because it has endured between the past and now”35
Similar to temporal object which has not yet come, it also ap-
peared as present through a directed glance of attention toward an ob-
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ject.  For example, when we have a precisely determined plan and intu-
itively imagine what is planned as future reality.  So this temporal object of
expectation is not represented in fantasy, but it is also perceived as actu-
ally now, as Husserl remarked:
…expectation finds its fulfillment in a perception.  It
pertains to the essence of the expected that it is an about-
to-be-perceived.  In view of this, it is evident that if what
is expected makes its appearance, i.e., becomes some-
thing present, the expectational situation itself has gone
by.36
The Presence of Temporal Flow
This is the consciousness of a particular item in the ordering as the
now, the just then, or the not yet.  Husserl’s evidence is that we are able
to draw the elapsed temporal objects into the now as a primal impression
from retentional consciousness.  The directed glance of attention toward
an object leads to the movement of perception.  Just as the elapsed tem-
poral object, the expected one is intended to be now in the course of lived
experience.
This presence of temporal flow is a necessary condition for the
occurrence of a primal impression; if a primal impression occurs, then the
consciousness of temporal flow must have been presented.  In other words,
if one were aware of a memory, then one could be aware of the flow of
time-consciousness.  Therefore, there are two kinds of temporal object;
an immanent and a transcendent one which bind together in the stream of
time-consciousness.  Specifically, the transcendence is an essential quality
which is considered as background leading to the presence of the living
present.  In other words, if one were aware of an immanent object, one
must be aware of a transcendent object which is its movement.  This
transcendent quality is continued in the constitution of the temporality of
the enduring thing itself with its now, before and after.  Similarly, a spatial
thing having its potentiality of changing orientation brings about the living
now. This temporalizing space, thus, is an essential process of the emer-
gence of the architectural building in the moment of lived experience.
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The Presence of Identical Unity
It is precisely the business of phenomenology to grasp objective
reality and to make it completely reasonable.  The final consequence of
temporalizing space is to clarify it in the terms of identical unity.  Its pres-
ence is not merely possible for the individual, but for all sentient beings.  It
is defined in terms of the assumption that everyone is conscious of the
same thing, appearing as such, at the same time.  Further, it is the percep-
tion of unity of space and time. Undoubtedly, Husserl provided the pres-
ence of identical unity to affirm that the subject causes objective reality to
occur.   Because a true item of knowledge can be considered as the unity
of various perspectives of everyone toward an event in which they per-
ceive and agree on its being the one and the same thing.  This is an original
meaning of objectivity which has been neglected by empirical sciences
throughout the century. Scientists entirely separated objectivity from sub-
jectivity, while Husserl wants to reunite the two.
Husserl also provided a tightly unified space and time to identify
what objective reality exactly meant.   Human experiences, events, inno-
vations and the like emerge in space and endures in time.  In addition to
saturating time and space, identical unity carry some messages which
manifest themselves at the present.  If scientists can find the truth through
apprehending natural law of all physical things, then Husserl can find it
through apprehending natural law of consciousness which is lawfully psy-
chological act of all human beings. His investigating the trace of time is
reliable.  In so doing, messages hiding behind the material foreground are
allowed to exhibit themselves. Then, the presence of identical unity is true
and needs no proof.  Thus, Husserl concluded that not all physical things
can be objective reality, unless they have been temporalized.
In brief, a beautiful thing is able to be the standard for measuring
human experience and cognition.  This becoming one and the same of
spatiality and temporality can constitute some significant places in relation
to physical world.  In particular, temporalizing space brings about appre-
hension of the correct meaning of objectivity. As a result of these three
concomitant appearances, a beautiful thing can not only immanently exist
in our memory, but also transfer its message outside of the barriers of time
and place. Husserl’s originality in investigating trace of time, thus, is a
paradigm for revealing of what people’s really thinking by no means of
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physical tools.
I have argued that Husserl’s directed glance of attention toward
the appearing thing leads to absolute perception.  In addition to perceiving
surfaces of a physical object in the terms of shape, color and so on, we
can be aware of it as a temporal object which has a deep meaning con-
cerning subjective conscious life.  That is to say, Husserl’s directed glance
of attention toward the appearing thing is a major device for seeking and
apprehending a real meaning of the same thing in which either memories of
past or expectancies of future events appeared as the flow of the living
present.
Tripitaka kept by Nhong Khu Lu community,
Ubonratchathani province.
Samray Church, the first Protestant community in
Thailand.  http://www.manager.co.th/Daily/ViewNews.
aspx?NewsID=9470000065116
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IV.  Evaluation of Husserl’s Thought about Temporalizing Space
Why do we need objective reality?  It is to know ourselves as a
being living together inseparably with others.  Indeed, it is a major aim of
phenomenology, as introduced by Merleau-Ponty, “we must begin by
reawakening the basic experience of the world of which science is the
second-order expression…Rationality is not a problem”.37
Bangkokian way of life in river condominium. http://www. aanda.co.th/
ap_list001.html
When we turn to architecture, we can appreciate the validity of
Husserl’s observations about temporalizing space.  It enables us to look
at a piece of architecture from the perspective of temporality.  Some struc-
tures express their age and are still attractive and livable.  Some contem-
porary styles of tower buildings are designed to send messages of cheer-
ful vitality and anticipate a future to come.  This temporalizing space can
also allow us to address a major issue of architecture, that is, how do
people inhabit their places. How does architecture influence the way we
live, how they consider their future and their surrounding community.  For
instance, it allows us to consider the phenomenon of the many communi-
ties old wooden houses and buildings placed haphazardly within the newer
urban city. According to phenomenological aesthetics, a beautiful place
does not depend on drawing or positing something into a surface, or con-
sidering dwellings as we would mere furniture.  Rather, it shows that ar-
chitecture should be designed to bring out people’s memories and expec-
tations into being. Such moments of lived experience should be designed
into a piece of architecture as much as possible so that these meaningful
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places can lead to meaningful mutual understanding of the world.
As shown, by Husserl’s process of temporalizing space, every-
one can be conscious of the same thing, appearing as such, at the same
time. Consequently, the communal lived experience of time is the key to
allowing the beautiful thing to occur.
V.  Conclusion
The temporality of architecture is the interchange between space-
time in consciousness that allows the able to reside in a worldly place.  Its
process, temporalizing space, creates an awareness in us of a beautiful
thing which goes beyond mere faade, but shows the temporal object as
an essential quality.  This means that an item of architecture must have a
place in time, determined by the people themselves, in order for it to
become a sign of objective reality.  Husserl’s aesthetic judgment has been
frequently challenged, in particular his presumption of the presence of the
now.  Yet, from examining his lectures on The Phenomenology of Inter-
nal Time-Consciousness, I feel that Husserl succeeded in demonstrating
the importance of the actually temporal now, before and after in the con-
tinuous stream of time-consciousness.  In the end he found the necessary
condition for the presence of objective reality, that is, the awareness of
temporal flow.  Therefore, this approach provides rich possibilities for the
understanding of architecture.
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